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Proactive Compliance?  
Repercussions of National Product Regulation in  
Standards of Transnational Business Networks 
ABSTRACT 
This paper (‘Sfb-Arbeitspapier’) illustrates the links between the self-regulation of 
transnational business networks and the law by analysing the management of chemical 
substance risks in the electric and electronic equipment industry. National product regu-
lation (and to some extent regulation of production processes) can influence standards 
employed globally by leading corporations within their network of suppliers and con-
tract manufacturers. However, it is also shown that the diffusion of regulatory standards 
within transnational production networks is not a linear process: corporate actors to 
some extent selectively appropriate standards and proactively self-regulate substances 
of concern that are not yet regulated by state-based law. Similarly, the suppliers may 
also influence the contents of the standards used in the network. 
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Proactive Compliance?  
Repercussions of National Product Regulation in  
Standards of Transnational Business Networks1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to popular opinion, economic globalisation and stringent environmental 
standards do not go well together: In the context of global trade and open markets, eco-
nomic actors are free to choose their locations with regard to the costs and benefits of 
the applicable legal orders. The nation state, which used to be the sovereign author of 
mandatory regulation, has– according to this view – become a mere subject of regula-
tory competition. In consequence, this is expected to lead to an erosion of often costly 
environmental requirements in OECD countries (the so-called ‘Delaware effect’, or 
‘race to the bottom’). While the notion of regulatory competition makes some sense 
regarding the rules applicable to production processes in the context of foreign direct 
investments, product standards in the context of free trade follow a different logic (see 
Scharpf, 1994: 480 ff.). 
In contrast to production facilities that can theoretically be relocated in low-standard 
jurisdictions to circumvent environmental regulation, the products themselves have to 
be adapted to various regulatory contexts to be globally marketable. Instead of differen-
tiating between production lines for various markets, transnational corporations need to 
design uniform products that comply even with the strictest jurisdiction to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale and avoid transaction costs (Douglas and Craig, 1995: 9; 
Vogel, 1995: 250). Some political scientists and environmental lawyers therefore stress 
that the ‘race to the bottom’-effect does not apply to environmental regulation in the 
context of free trade in general (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; Scharpf, 1994). The dy-
namics of environmental product regulation have even been described as having a ‘Cali-
fornia’ rather than a ‘Delaware’ effect (Vogel, 1995: 5 f).2 Accordingly, not regulatory 
                                                 
1  This text will be published in: Responsible Business: Self-Governance In Transnational Economic Transactions, 
Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter, eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming. It owes a lot to helpful 
comments on earlier drafts by Martin Herberg, Fabian Sosa and Gerd Winter, and to the other participants of our 
workshop in June 2005 at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain. It has also profited 
from the comments of two anonymous reviewers. The relentless efforts of my mother, Karin Dilling (née Ban-
field), and the excellent final correction of Vicki May helped to enhance the English style and readability. Re-
maining flaws and idiosyncrasies are due to the author’s stubbornness. 
2  The term ‘Delaware effect’ is derived from an example of regulatory competition in the USA, as many corpora-
tions are registered in Delaware because of lower costs of incorporation; the term ‘California effect’ was coined 
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competition, but rather another political mechanism called ‘trading-up’ would character-
ise the relation between globalisation and environmental standards: exporting corpora-
tions already complying with strict standards of importing countries are inclined to put 
pressure on their domestic jurisdiction to restore fair rules of competition by also raising 
their environmental standards. 
However, the idea that globally operating corporations invariably comply with all na-
tional laws and therefore inevitably contribute to a California effect, seems to be based 
on an oversimplified model of regulatory compliance. Rather than being fully deter-
mined by national laws, transnational corporate standards and practices are developing a 
life of their own (Teubner, 1997; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2006: 41 ff.; see al-
ready Luhmann, 1971). In terms of environmental protection, this autonomous devel-
opment may have negative or positive effects: On the one hand regulatory compliance is 
called into question on account of widely perceived implementation deficits even in a 
national context; on the other hand a proactive attitude of corporate actors practising 
self-regulation might even contribute to the emergence of new regulatory standards.3 
The question of how well environmental standards accompany economic globalisation 
should therefore not only be analysed in terms of political mechanisms like regulatory 
competition or trading up. Rather, we should scrutinize the emergence of transnational 
corporate standards and their role in the evolution of global environmental standards. 
Many of these corporate standards affect not only environmental management practices 
within individual organisations themselves, but establish inter-organisational duties that 
spread throughout transnational business networks. This paper will thus contribute to 
the discussion on economic globalisation and environmental regulation by analysing 
corporate product standards in business networks in an empirical study. 
In the following section, the proactive compliance hypothesis, on which the study is 
based, will be presented, before an account of the empirical study on proactive compli-
ance is given (C.), from which theoretical conclusions are drawn (D.). 
II.  PROACTIVE COMPLIANCE HYPOTHESIS 
The criteria for analysing the corporate standards have been based on the following pro-
active compliance hypothesis, integrating the notion of more or less autonomous corpo-
rate standards into the ‘California effect’ theory. The hypothesis thus combines ele-
ments of regulatory compliance and of private self-regulation in a transnational context: 
In terms of environmental product norms, corporate standards tend to adapt national 
– or European – regulation to transnational product networks (global compliance) or 
                                                                                                                                               
by Vogel with reference to Californian automobile emission standards spreading to other States of the USA (Vo-
gel, 1995: 259). 
3  See also the two different scenarios in Vogel (1995: 248). 
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even to anticipate national regulation by means of self-regulation (anticipatory risk ma-
nagement), thereby partly assuming executive functions from the state and actively sha-
ping environmental policy. 
In the following two sections, the analytical frame of the hypothesis will further be 
developed, defining its scope in terms of the distinction between product and production 
norms (I.), considering the role of business networks (II.), and developing the different 
elements of the hypothesis (III.). 
A. Extraterritorial Impact of Product Norms 
Although both theories concerning the Delaware effect and the California effect try to 
characterise global environmental governance in general, they actually draw on specific 
cases that do not represent the policy sector as a whole. 
David Vogel’s analysis of the California effect is focussed on the conflict between 
regulatory policy and free trade, which de facto occurs only with respect to standards 
applied to products. 4 By contrast, proponents of the ‘race to the bottom’ theory, in the 
debate about pollution havens and industrial locations in general, do not base their ar-
guments on the development of product standards, but rather on the regulation of pro-
duction processes. 
By explicit restriction to statements on environmental product norms, the ‘proactive 
compliance’ hypothesis, developed in this paper, tries to avoid such biased generalisa-
tions. 
A differentiation between standards formally applying to products and those apply-
ing to processes shows how both theories might be integrated: while regulatory compe-
tition seems to be working towards a deregulation of production standards, trading up-
mechanisms could enhance product standards.  
These differences are based on the potential extraterritorial impact of norms that 
formally apply to products. Product standards - in that formal sense of applicability - 
either cause a disruption of trade or have de facto extraterritorial effects, when foreign 
importers are forced to comply. While product standards can have the effect of a ‘tax’ 
on foreign production and are therefore a legal issue of free trade, production standards 
make domestic production more costly (Vogel, 1995: 21, 263). They are thus not dis-
criminatory against foreign imports, but – on the contrary – have the effect of a ‘tax’ on 
                                                 
4  David Vogel did not systematically develop the difference between product and production standards, but mainly 
based his explanation of the difference between ‘Delaware effect’ and ‘California effect’ phenomena on the ar-
gumentation that costs of environmental standards are negligible compared to the cost of labour, Vogel (1995), 6, 
256 f; for the distinction between product and production-related standards, see p. 6, 263. 
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domestic production and are primarily discussed in the political debate on industrial 
locations (Vogel, 1995: 20 f).5  
It is, however, not always possible to draw a clear line between product and produc-
tion standards. Sandwiched between clear-cut product and production-related standards 
there are certain hybrid forms, due to ambiguities in the distinction made between the 
two kinds of standards. An example is the famous tuna-dolphin case under WTO law: 
basically the USA banned imports of tuna from Mexico caught in fishing nets which do 
not prevent dolphins from being killed.6 Another example from chemicals regulation is 
labelling requirements for products manufactured using ozone-depleting substances 
such as CFCs. Even though the import regulations formally apply to a product, both 
target a production risk. Hence, legislators sometimes try to regulate production proc-
esses and their risks indirectly by developing rules which formally apply to products 
(Vogel, 1995: 18; see also Dilling, 2005: 283 ff), but in content are nevertheless related 
to production methods. Such hybrid cases of regulation are also covered in this paper. It 
could be expected that these – with respect to their contents – production-related stan-
dards show similar extraterritorial effects to product-related standards. 
On the other hand there are standards applying to production processes with the pur-
pose of enhancing environmental product quality, e.g. the ban on certain auxiliary sub-
stances, aiming at a reduction of product contamination. Such standards, which formally 
refer to production but substantially target product risks, are sometimes referred to in 
corporate standards.  
Chart 1: References and Examples of the Product – Production Distinction 
Substantial Reference: Regulatory Issue or Purpose  
Products Production 
Products ban on a substance in pro-duct, e.g. lead in solder 
labelling requirement for products 
manufactured using CFCs Formal Reference: 
Scope of  
Application Production 
Regulation of auxiliary 
substance to prevent pro-
duct contamination 
‘end of pipe’ emission thresholds 
 
And, of course, unambiguous cases of product standards are covered, like the ban on 
lead in solders for electronic equipment. What is not included are those standards that 
clearly refer to production processes: e.g. emission thresholds, which restrict the effec-
tive emission of a substance from a production plant (see Chart 1). Thus standards can 
                                                 
5  With respect to the regulation of inherent properties of tradable manufacturing plants, a conflict between free 
trade and standards, formally applying to production processes, could arise. In this comparatively rare case, stan-
dards for products are at the same time standards for production facilities, as both categories coincide in one regu-
latory object; see also Rehbinder/Stewart (1985). 
6  See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 ILM 1594. 
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on the one hand be divided into those that – formally – apply to products and those ap-
plying to production methods; on the other hand they can be divided into those stan-
dards that – substantially – aim at product risks and those directed at production risks.  
B. The Role of Business Networks for Private Environmental Standards 
For various reasons public authorities are overburdened by environmental and social 
issues in transnational production networks. Apart from the fact that these networks are 
beyond the territorial reach of any single national jurisdiction, they are characterised by 
opaque, fragmented organisational structures and often contribute to highly specific 
environmental risks. A preventive approach by command and control, i.e. definite rules 
with clear law enforcement mechanisms, often fails (see e.g. Teubner, 1983; Acker-
mann and Stewart, 1985; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). The regulated issues tend to be 
too complex and dynamic to be sufficiently determined by hierarchical legal interven-
tion. 
Moreover, systems theorists claim that the economic subsystem is developing ‘a life 
of its own’, organised in accordance with economic rationality and no longer responsive 
to political or legal imperatives (Luhmann, 2004). Contrary to this view it has been ar-
gued that emerging organisational structures of the private sector could be seen as a 
chance rather than an obstacle to regulation (Mayntz, 1987: 89, 100 ff). It would require 
a closer look at the organisational structures of the regulatory field to clarify this. 
One possible regulatory strategy is the introduction of individual producer responsi-
bility, which allocates responsibility for product risks with the manufacturer without 
defining precise duties of risk management (Sachs, 2006). However, the example of 
hazardous e-wastes shows that production and distribution structures consist of diverse 
agents and are characterised by a fragmented organisational structure. E-waste genera-
tion is therefore ‘diffuse’ (Courtney, 2006: 222). A unilateral stipulation of duties, 
which would be the option within a vertically integrated corporation, seems to be im-
possible in most parts of the electronics sector with its fragmented organisational struc-
ture.  
Even if the organisational structures are opaque and fragmented, some corporate ac-
tors involved in the marketing of consumer products, so-called lead firms, are highly 
visible and therefore vulnerable to NGO or media campaigns affecting their image. Ad-
ditionally, despite their fragmented formal structures, corporate networks are often 
marked by close business relationships with intense cooperation and control (Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz, 1994). Thus, the hierarchically structured corporation of mass pro-
duction, as famously conceived and implemented by Henry Ford, has not been replaced 
by anonymous arm’s-length markets. 
Rather than establishing pre-modern, informal social bonds between the business 
partners, however, the organisation of customer-supplier relations in modern industrial 
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production seems to be characterised by formalised routines. Monitoring, benchmarking 
and certification systems encourage the participation of suppliers in product and produc-
tion design and set a common framework for collective learning processes (Sabel, 
1994).  These routines generate and continuously enhance inter-organisational standards 
that are essential to ensure an integrated quality management throughout the supply 
chain. 
At the same time, a critical public has emerged on a transnational level, holding mul-
tinational corporations globally responsible for their business partners’ actions. Many 
corporations responded to accusations by establishing codes of conduct or other stan-
dards, which were not only binding for themselves, but also for business partners or 
even for all other agents in the supply chain (Teubner, 2005).  
The complex interdependencies between the actors in corporate production networks 
can lead to a further diffusion of the standards within the corporate sphere.  It is exactly 
the open organisational structure of such networks that helps to spread standards to all 
businesses within them (Teubner, 2005: 116). 
C. Types of Proactive Compliance 
According to the proactive compliance hypothesis, private standards for products are 
developed in the shadow of various jurisdictions relevant for the production of globally 
marketable products - and sometimes even precede expected regulatory developments. 
On the other hand, the proactive compliance hypothesis acknowledges that corporate 
standards are not only determined by public regulation, but follow a logic of their own. 
Proactive compliance thus combines elements of regulatory compliance and self-
regulation.  
The orientation of corporate standards towards public regulation and public policy is 
manifested in (a) the generalisation and (b) anticipation of public regulation (see 
Chart 2):  
(a) Generalisation of norms and policies can lead to the global application of terri-
torially restricted public regulation. These geographical generalisations may ei-
ther be based on de facto extraterritorial effects, when economic efficiency 
forces corporate actors to apply a standard mandatory for some markets to all 
products (compliance), or on the voluntary adoption of national norms, e.g. 
norms without extraterritorial impact, such as production norms (self-
regulation). An example for geographically generalised global compliance is 
the adoption of the EU ban on lead in electronic solder in various transnational 
corporate standards. An example for a self-regulatory geographical generalisa-
tion  is corporate standards adopting bans on the use of ozone-depleting chlo-
rinated fluorocarbons (CFCs) as solvents in the production of semiconductors - 
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irrespective of whether or not the producing countries are signatory states of 
the Montreal Protocol. 
(b) The Anticipation of norms and policies can lead to the application of legal 
norms earlier than formally required to enable a smooth transition period with 
effective compliance at the legal cut-off date (compliance), or even the applica-
tion of values and principles expressed in legal norms to other, not yet regu-
lated cases with comparable toxic or ecotoxic risks (self-regulation). An exam-
ple of anticipatory compliance with respect to the implementation of a legal 
norm can be found in corporate standards referring to the EU Directive on the 
restriction of hazardous substances in electronic and electrical equipment, but 
giving a much earlier deadline for compliance than legally required. An exam-
ple for the anticipatory implementation of a political objective is a corporate 
standard prohibiting a certain substance not yet regulated after the launch of a 
political campaign for the prohibition of that substance. An example is the re-
cent case of perfluorinated chemicals, which have not been regulated yet by a 
political legislator, but sometimes appear in corporate standards. 
Chart 2: Types of Proactive Compliance and Examples 
 Compliance Self-Regulation 
Generalisations of 
Norms and Policies 
global compliance of national norm: 
de facto-extraterritorial effects of 
EU lead ban 
autonomous extraterritorial use of 
national norm: ban on the use of 
CFCs as solvents 
Anticipation of Norms 
and Policies 
early compliance with legal norm:  
early deadline for compliance with 
EU-Directive 
anticipatory self-regulation of  
political goal:  
ban on substance not yet regulated 
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
A. Sample 
The proactive compliance hypothesis will be tested by analysing certain corporate envi-
ronmental standards on the use of chemical substances in products and production proc-
esses by means of textual analysis and descriptive statistics. 
These standards were employed by corporate actors with their head office in Japan 
(18), the USA (11), the EU (9), South Korea (1) or Canada (1). The standards, of mostly 
big multinational corporations, not only apply to their own production, but are inter-
organisational corporate standards insofar as they are also applied to direct business 
partners, like suppliers or contract manufacturers – or even other agents in the supply 
chain with no direct contractual relation to the focal company at all. The study is based 
on 40 corporate standards that were publicly accessible by Internet.7 All standards be-
                                                 
7  They were found between spring 2004 and autumn 2005 with the help of the search-engine www.google.com, 
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long to companies or corporate groups that– at least to some extent – manufacture elec-
tronic or electrical equipment. Most of them either specialise in electrical and electronic 
equipment (17), or in information technology hardware (17); five corporations combine 
electronics with mechanical engineering; one corporation specialises in telecommunica-
tion services. 
More than half the corporations of the sample are included in a 2005 global ranking 
of the 500 largest corporations.8 Taken together, all these corporations had revenues 
amounting to approximately one trillion (or 1,000,000,000,000) U.S. dollars in the fiscal 
year 2005. Compared to political economies, this figure comes close to the total German 
revenue in the budgetary year of 2005. Many of the firms issuing the accessible con-
trolled substance lists are corporate leaders of their sector, with various business rela-
tionships in- and outside the electronics sector and often with paradigmatic influence on 
their competitors. 
In this sector complex products are manufactured to be used by consumers. Com-
pared to the automotive industry, the electronics industry is characterised by an even 
more dynamic technological development, a more fragmented organisational structure 
and fewer integrating activities of industry associations. Furthermore, the study analyses 
the management of toxic risk that is usually present from early stages of the production 
chain onwards and continues to be relevant till the end of the individual product’s life 
cycle. As opposed to risks generated at the last step of the production chain, like electri-
cal or mechanical health hazards, even more actors have to cooperate to effectively 
manage the overall toxic risk. Any toxic risk management coordinated by the private 
actors of such production networks are likely to be more difficult than in cases with less 
complex products, fewer unforeseeable uses, less dynamic technological development 
and less fragmented organisational production structures, as well as fewer production 
stages.  
Given these characteristics and the trendsetting, paradigmatic character of this sector, 
it seems plausible that the results of the empirical study will have prospective value for 
product regulation in general.  
However, it should also be considered that in contrast to the agricultural sector or, 
say, the production of simple textiles, the production of electronic equipment is highly 
globalised and export-oriented, and the various actors of the electronics production net-
works are highly interdependent. As the mechanisms analysed in this study are mostly 
based on both inter-firm and transnational interdependencies within the production 
                                                                                                                                               
using typical catch-words (like ‘supplier’, ‘controlled’ or ‘banned’) and numbers of the Chemical Abstract Ser-
vice (CAS), relevant for these lists. A complete list of the standards can be found in an appendix to this paper. 
8  See Fortune: The Global 500 2005, see www.cnn.com/fortune/, last visited 8th May 2006. 
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chain as well as the export-orientation of the final manufacturers, the results cannot be 
transferred to a sector still mainly dominated by domestic production and arm’s length 
transactions of the free market. The fragmented network structures encompassing many 
involved actors should not so much be seen as obstacles to coordination processes, since 
in contrast to mere market relations, they rather help to spread standards, and they do 
also present possibilities for inter-firm governance. 
B. Corporate Substance Lists 
The analysed standards are listed in so-called ‘Controlled Substance Lists’ and ‘Green 
Procurement Guidelines’. Basically these are used to communicate the standards con-
cerning the restrictions on use and disclosure requirements for chemicals used for prod-
ucts – and sometimes also production processes – to business partners and other actors 
in the supply chain. 
Only recently have they emerged as formal company standards in the electronics sec-
tor. As many of the standards prominently refer to an EU Directive made in 2003, regu-
lating the contents of electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS Directive),9 their emer-
gence could be directly related to it. In fact, most of the latest versions of the corporate 
lists in the sample were issued between 2003 and 2005, yet some are older – one list 
dates back to 2000.  
However, according to the first release dates, given in the overviews on the first page 
of the corporate lists, early versions were drawn up in the early 1990s by European 
companies.10 At first, they seem to have served primarily as internal corporate norms for 
the design of new products (Hall, 2001: 30 f). In the 1990s Japanese Green Procurement 
Standards were developed and adopted by many Asian Corporations. Since the adoption 
of the above mentioned RoHS Directive in 2003, however, these standards have become 
increasingly common, not only among outstanding lead firms, but also among other 
actors in the supply chain who do not receive so much public attention. 
Still, the emergence of these corporate standards seems to be a development rather 
independent from legislative processes: ‘global compliance’ does not imply that com-
pliance with EU Directives (or rather: their corresponding national transposition acts) is 
                                                 
9  Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on the restriction of the 
use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. For the international discussion of this 
European legislation and its effects on the U.S. electrical industry see Sachs, 2006; Boon, 2006; and Courtney, 
2006. 
10  1992 is given as a first release date for BTExact Technologies, no date; 1994 for Siemens, 2003. The first devel-
opments seem to go back to the late 1980s or early 1990s, also Bosch, according to a German chemical risk man-
agement consultant (Interview: Krefeld, 25.02.2005). In the automotive industry the first standards seem to have 
been established by Ford in 1984 and Chrysler in 1987 (Ford, 2003; DaimlerChrysler, 1997). 
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the main or even the only motive for private standards. On the contrary, if our hypothe-
sis is right, the only thing that can be said with is that relevant national regulation and 
policy agendas can influence the details of already existing industrial standards.  
The typical contents of a corporate standard on banned, restricted and reportable sub-




¾ Disclaimer  
¾ Reference Documents 
¾ Substance List  
This structure (or at least the first part containing: purpose, scope, definitions) resem-
bles the usual contents of formal legislation as enacted by the political legislator. This is 
partly due to the common functional requirements of private standards and formal legal 
acts, both aimed at the protection of public interests. For example: an explicitly defined 
purpose can help a lot with the interpretation of norms in a hard case. To some extent, 
therefore, this quasi-legal formal structure may also be a stylistic means to stress the 
binding and authoritative character of that type of document. This is sometimes mani-
fested in a seemingly superficial adherence to a formal structure: in many documents 
the purpose does not seem to be worded carefully, but rather arbitrarily defined, and 
thus considerably inconsistent. Sometimes the paragraph headed ‘purpose’ consists of 
an abstract of the whole document. Often legal compliance, compliance with customer 
requirements or the protection of the environment and workplace security, or a combi-
nation of these different objectives are given as the main purpose.  
The binding and authoritative character of the documents is the prevailing impression 
conveyed by most standards. Many standards that actually only include formal legal 
requirements from different jurisdictions try to convince the reader that these are genu-
ine requirements of the corporation. Of the complete sample of 40 standards, only two 
or three standards of German corporations include explicit exceptions from this authori-
tative and binding normative character. According to Siemens, its ‘list of prohibited 
substances is for information only. It is not a legally binding document’ (Siemens, 
2003). The Bosch list explicitly adheres to the requirements given by European Law 
and a list of declarable materials by the German Association of the Automotive Industry 
(VDA).11 Moreover, many of these ‘requirements’ are only to be applied if ‘explicitly 
stipulated on the order’ to a supplier (Bosch, 2004). Two other corporate lists were just 
too vague to allow a precise evaluation of their standards. 
                                                 
11  VDA Materials Declaration List. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 64) 
- 11 - 
In the corporate standards there is a certain tension between an altruistic or ethical 
and a more opportunistic, strategic argumentation: especially in the introductory parts of 
the Japanese Green Procurement Guidelines, a deep concern for ecology and a healthy 
environment are declared to be an integral part of the corporate culture of the enterprise. 
Other standards seem to be much less ambitious: no clear commitment to corporate en-
vironmental and social responsibility is made; sometimes only compliance with the ex-
istent law and regulations is given as purpose of the standard, as well as the anticipation 
of future laws. The general appearance and formal lay-out of these substance lists re-
sembles other corporate standards in the areas of quality management or workers’ pro-
tection. Therefore, they have a more technical appearance. 
Typically, the scope of the analysed standards explicitly covers products purchased 
from other manufacturers, which are either integrated into their own products or sold as 
their own products (in case of production by contract manufacturers). These products 
might be substances, preparations or articles, or - in the terminology of the electronics’ 
sector – materials and parts, as well as subassemblies, and finished consumer products. 
The standards are all addressed to suppliers, but some are additionally still addressed to 
internal divisions of the corporation, such as the purchasing department. In some cases, 
the scope also covers substances which are used in the manufacturing process of the 
purchased parts and materials. 
Many corporate standards give an overview of all included reference documents. 
These could be legal norms as well as customer requirements and sometimes more gen-
eral standards of the same corporation.  
The fact that customers’ corporate standards are displayed on an equal footing with 
formal legislation shows how important they are for their business partners, and demon-
strates the functional parallels between formal legal norms and private corporate stan-
dards. With reference to these lists a disclaimer may be included, giving notice that even 
though the relevant legal requirements are integrated into the corporate standard, suppli-
ers should still keep themselves informed of current legal developments. 
C. Legal frame  
The regulation of substance risks through corporate standards in the transnational pro-
duction of electrical and electronic equipment does not take place in a normative vac-
uum, but is framed by certain legal requirements. Of particular importance for corporate 
standards is national or EU legislation. International law also plays a role in the regula-
tory field. For a concise analysis of the corporate standards and a distinction between 
the different forms of compliance and self-regulation a survey of the legal context is 
necessary. For the purposes of testing the hypothesis presented in Section II above, the 
legislation of jurisdictions with economic potential for the global marketplace, like the 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 64) 
- 12 - 
EU, Japan, the USA, Germany, or – as an example for the sub-national level - the State 
of California is likely to be most informative.  
To study the extraterritorial effects of national regulation, it is then necessary to ana-
lyse cases of a clear regulatory divide between a high standard in one jurisdiction and 
low standards in other jurisdictions concerning one substance or substance group. In 
particular, the selection of a specific substance group that is subject to a ban or restric-
tion in one jurisdiction only would help to isolate the impact of the jurisdiction on 
global standards of corporations. To eliminate alternative independent variables, the 
highest standards should not always be sought in the same jurisdiction, but for different 
substances in different jurisdictions. Otherwise it could, for instance, be presumed that 
corporate standards are simply oriented towards one special jurisdiction, for whatever 
reason. 
1. International Law 
In the past 15 years, several relevant conventions on international chemicals legislation 
have been signed, such as the prohibition of persistent organic pollutants by the Stock-
holm convention and ozone-depleting substances in the Montreal Protocol.  
Under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic, the Paris Commission (PARCOM) has issued several decisions with re-
spect to the use and disposal of hazardous substances. Of these, PARCOM Decision 
95/1 on short-chain chlorinated paraffins is relevant, which required a two-step phasing 
out process of these substances, which are used e.g. as flame retardants and plasticisers, 
by 2004. Short-chain chlorinated paraffins are persistent, bioaccumulative pollutants 
that have adverse effects on marine organisms. However, this decision remained inef-
fective, as it was apparently only transposed into national law by the Netherlands. 
2. EU and Member State Law 
With respect to bans on substances and their applications in the electronics, electrical 
equipment and automotive sectors the most demanding requirements are virtually al-
ways laid down by the EU or their member states. The main legislative acts that are 
relevant here are the Reduction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS) already 
mentioned above, the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive (ELV) with specific impact on the 
production of electronics for vehicles, and, for chemicals in general, Directive 
76/769/EEC on Restrictions on the Marketing and Use of certain substances and prepa-
rations.  
The RoHS and ELV Directives belong to the field of waste regulation. Following the 
preventive approach to waste regulation adopted for a while now in the EU, both direc-
tives aim at the reduction of certain hazardous substances. These substances pose con-
siderable problems for the recycling and disposal of these products. The RoHS Direc-
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tive (and, similarly, the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive) therefore prohibits materials 
and components from containing heavy metals such as lead, mercury, cadmium and 
hexavalent chromium, and certain flame retardants. Several exemptions have been 
made, however, which have to be amended by the EU Commission in line with techni-
cal and scientific progress on a regular basis.  
Directive 76/769/EEC contains a regularly updated list of chemical substances whose 
marketing and use is prohibited or restricted in the EU. The substances included that are 
relevant for the sectors under analysis here are asbestos, certain heavy metals, PCB and 
various others.  
Directive 67/548/EEC on Dangerous Substances also includes relevant chemicals. 
All substances listed in its Annex I must be labelled according to their classification. 
However, Directive 67/548/EEC applies only with respect to chemical substances as 
such and in connection with Directive 1999/45/EC on preparations such as paints, adhe-
sives, additives, etc. Substances included in durable articles (such as electronic or elec-
trical equipment) are not generally subject to chemicals regulation. Only in certain cir-
cumstances are they covered by the new REACH Regulation, which was passed after 
the empirical study, this paper is based on, had been completed.12 The current reform of 
European chemicals law changes little in that respect.13 According to Article 176 of the 
EEC Treaty, EU member state law can be stricter than the respective European legal 
acts, based on Art. 175 of the Treaty. As Directive 76/769/EEC is based on Art. 95 EEC 
Treaty, notice must be given of stricter national requirements according to Art. 95 (4) 
EEC Treaty and they must be approved by the European Commission. As mentioned 
above, the Netherlands have transposed the ban on short-chain chlorinated paraffins 
issued by the international Paris Commission. This transposition, which is stricter than 
Directive 76/769/EEC has only been partly approved.14 
Switzerland also has exceptionally strict requirements. Even  though  small countries 
such as the Netherlands or Switzerland may play a minor role as importing markets, 
explicit references can be found in some of the Japanese and U.S. American standards. 
                                                 
12  The REACH Regulation uses the somewhat cumbersome definition of articles as objects ‘composed of one or 
more substances or preparations which during production is given a specific shape, surface or design determining 
its end use function to a greater degree than its chemical composition does”, Art. 3 REACH.  
13  According to Art. 7 REACH, registration requirements exist only in some cases for dangerous substances inte-
grated into imported articles that are released during expected use. 
14  See Commission Decision 2004/1/EC of 16 December 2003 concerning national provisions on the use of short-
chain chlorinated paraffins, notified by the Kingdom of the Netherlands under Article 95(4) of the EC Treaty. 
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3. U.S. Federal and State Law 
U.S. American federal law of primary relevance for our purposes is the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act and the Clean Air Act. The Toxic Substances Control Act includes 
prohibitions or restrictions for a few substances or substance groups like asbestos and 
PCBs. Under the Toxic Substances Control Act the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is also commissioned to prepare the regulation of highly persistent and 
bioaccumulative substances still widely used in the semiconductor industry and many 
other sectors, as they are suspected of being carcinogenic.15 The U.S. Clean Air Act Sec. 
611, as amended in 1990, not only requires the labelling of products containing ozone-
depleting substances, but also the labelling of products imported to the USA that are 
manufactured with certain ozone-depleting substances. These requirements of the U.S. 
Clean Air Act could thus indirectly affect offshore production. In 1993, additional rules 
of the U.S. EPA qualified that these labelling requirements only apply if the manufac-
turers themselves use ozone-depleting substances under certain circumstances, e.g. if  
such substances are not completely destroyed after use or if they have physical contact 
with the manufactured product in a way that is not merely incidental, etc. 
U.S. State legislation on the toxic properties of products include the State of Califor-
nia Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Proposition 65), which 
requires a warning for every chemical known to cause cancer or reproductive defects. A 
list of such substances is updated every few years. 
4. Japanese Law 
Japanese chemicals law partly transposes international obligations, and partly has genu-
ine requirements, especially concerning the authorisation of certain substances danger-
ous to the marine environment. Asbestos is restricted by the Industrial Health and 
Safety Law; the obligations of the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances 
have been implemented by the Ozone Layer Protection Law. Other relevant substances 
are regulated by the Japanese Chemical Substance Control Law.16 Regulated substances 
either require authorization, like bis(tributyltin)oxide, polychlorinated naphthalenes, 
PCB and other organic pollutants as well as products in which such substances are used 
(see Articles 2 (2), 6 and 14 of the Chemical Substance Control Law), or notification 
and labelling, like other organotin compounds. Polychlorinated naphthalenes are not 
                                                 
15  See e.g. the initiative of the U.S. EPA on perfluoroalkyl sulfonates (PFAS), and especially perfluorooctanic acid 
(PFOA), at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/pfoa/, last visited 21 February 2007. 
16  Law Concerning the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of their Manufacture, etc., Law No. 117, 
October 16, 1973, last amended by Law No. 49 May 28, 2003 (available in provisional translation by the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 64) 
- 15 - 
regulated in the EU (nor in the USA), which may be due to the fact that it is a substance 
with a low production volume and only one supplier in the EU. However, in Switzer-
land a ban on polychlorinated naphthalenes exists, albeit rarely cited in corporate stan-
dards.17 Other substances regulated in Japan, like bis(tributyltin)oxide, which does not 
seem to be a relevant substance for the electronics sector, are also regulated in the EU – 
at least labelling requirements exist.  
5. Conclusions for the Research Design 
There are several cases of relevant substances with a clear regulatory divide between the 
EU as a high-standard jurisdiction and the USA and Japan, where lower standards exist. 
Examples of substances in recent use in the electronics and automotive sector which– 
with exemptions – have been prohibited only in the EU by the RoHS Directive, are lead, 
cadmium, mercury and hexavalent chromium. Lead is still common in the electronics 
industry, especially for use in solders. Under the RoHS Directive additional prohibitions 
of PBB (polybrominated biphenyls) and PBDE (polybrominated diphenyl ethers) exist. 
PBDE are a group of flame retardants still used in the sector and often referenced in 
corporate standards, but are meanwhile of minor importance, as they can be substituted. 
However, many of the substitutes (often other brominated flame retardants) are also 
suspected of having adverse effects on human health and the environment.  
Both Directive 76/769/EEC and the afore-mentioned Dutch transposition of the Paris 
Commission decision contain restrictions on short-chain chlorinated paraffins, although 
the restrictions of the EU Directive do not or only marginally concern specific applica-
tions in the electronics sector. They could therefore serve as an example for the effec-
tiveness of product regulation by the jurisdiction of a relatively small political economy. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that corporate standards are also directly influ-
enced by the international PARCOM decision. Chlorinated Paraffins are used as plasti-
cisers in paints, coatings, sealants and flame-retardants in rubber and plastic. It seems to 
be unclear whether or to what extent they are still used in the electronics sector, but they 
are classified as a chemical substance group with a high production volume still with 
several producers or importers in the EU.18 
An outstanding regulatory initiative of the USA is the labelling requirement for the 
use of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances in offshore production. It is interest-
ing to see how the USA was able to spread standards for the environmentally friendly 
                                                 
17  Previously StoV, Annex 3.1 – in May 2005 replaced by Chemical Risk Reduction Ordinance (ChemRRV), see 
Annex 1.1 to Article 3 ChemRRV. 
18  See HPV-LPV Information on ‘Alkanes, C10-13, chloro’ in the European chemical Substances Information 
System (ESIS) supplied by the European Chemicals Bureau, http://ecb.jrc.it/ESIS/, last visited 21 February 2007. 
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manufacture of semi-conductors worldwide – by introducing regulatory measures for 
products manufactured with the aid of ozone-depleting substances.  
Regarding Japanese law, the authorisation requirement for polychlorinated naphtha-
lenes is considered to be the strictest regulation in one of the main jurisdictions. How-
ever, the Swiss ban on polychlorinated naphthalenes is an example of an even stricter 
regulation in a small jurisdiction. In the electronics sector, polychlorinated naphthalenes 
were formerly applied for similar purposes as PCBs (in capacitors etc.) and may have 
been used more recently as flame retardants. Since the 1970s, however, they have been 
phased out. Today even in the industrialised world the facts about their use seem un-
clear (Plassche and Schwegler, 2002). 
Chart 3: Examples Illustrating the Regulatory Divide between EU, USA and Japan 
Substance (Group) EU*) Japan U.S.**) Commonness of application in OECD 
PBDE BAN   may be still be used as flame-retardants in polymers 
Lead & compounds BAN  DIS commonly used for solders, cables, wires etc. 
Short-chain  
chlorinated paraffins RES   
before phase-out used in metalwork fluids 
such as flame retardants, plasticizers and 
lubricants 
Polychlorinated  
naphthalenes  DIS  
before phase-out used 
as additive to lubricants, rubber, paints etc. 
CFCs used in 
offshore production   DIS 
before phase-out used 
as solvent in the semiconductor production 
Annotations: 
*) Relevant restrictions on short chain chlorinated paraffins (aka alkanes, C10-C13, chloro) apply in the Nether-
lands only. 
**) The indicated disclosure requirement for lead applies in the U.S. State of California only.  
The table above (Chart 3) gives an overview of the divide between regulations and regu-
latory loopholes in the EU, the USA and Japan regarding the use of substances of con-
cern in the electronics sector; five exemplary substances and substance groups are se-
lected. ‘BAN’ signifies the prohibition of a substance for use in electrical and electronic 
equipment or its phasing out within a specified deadline in the next five years, although 
certain minor applications may be exempted.19 ‘RES’ refers to other material restrictions 
than prohibitions of substances. This can be a threshold limit, as in the case of short-
chain chlorinated paraffins restricted by Directive 76/769/EEC or a restriction on certain 
applications as in the Chlorinated Paraffins Decision of the Netherlands. DIS indicates a 
labelling or disclosure requirement (including the duty to supply safety data sheets), or 
notification or authorization requirements. A cell left blank signifies that in the indi-
                                                 
19  For such prohibitions a typical threshold limit would be 1000 ppm (the equivalent to 0.1 % by mass) for uninten-
tional contamination. For example, solder containing less than 1000 ppm is considered to be lead-free. 
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cated jurisdictions no regulations for the substance exist, which are applicable to prod-
ucts of the electronics sector.  
With respect to the use of lead in electronic equipment, apart from the EU ban, a dis-
closure requirement exists in the U.S. State of California. It is assumed that the ban is a 
stricter regulation than the disclosure requirement – even though in certain cases public 
disclosure requirements can have a prohibitive effect comparable to a ban. 
D. Empirical Analysis of the Different Types of Proactive Compliance 
To study compliance of corporate standards more closely, five substance groups were 
selected, including PBDE, lead and its compounds, short-chain chlorinated paraffins, 
polychlorinated naphthalenes, and certain ozone-depleting substances used in the off-
shore manufacturing of semiconductors (see Chart 3). For these substances a systematic 
evaluation of the 40 corporate standards has been carried out.  
Our question always was to what extent the highest standard of one of the three main 
jurisdictions of the global market (EU, USA, Japan) could also be found in the corpo-
rate substance list as a universally applicable transnational standard. Theoretically a 
globally compliant standard would consist of a combination of the highest standards of 
different jurisdictions. In practice, a comprehensive substance list that takes all applica-
ble public regulations of all jurisdictions into consideration is almost impossible to find. 
Whenever a universally applicable standard, incorporating the strictest public regulation 
on a specific substance, could be found in a corporate substance list, it was considered 
as ‘globally compliant’. To rule out the alternative reading that the compliance of corpo-
rate standards is still based on traditional mechanisms of national law enforcement, the 
compliance rate of ‘domestic’ corporations with their head office in the strictest juris-
diction, is compared to standards of ‘foreign’ companies registered outside the jurisdic-
tion in question (see Chart 4). 
During the evaluation of the lists it turned out that four of the 40 standards could not 
be considered globally compliant with respect to any or most of the six substances, even 
though they do not directly violate national legislation. These standards either explicitly 
restrict themselves to being merely ‘informative’ with respect to prohibited substances, 
or claim the territorially restricted applicability of national regulations.  
In many other cases, standards were partly globally compliant, and partly not explic-
itly compliant. There are many possible reasons for this; a substance may not be in-
cluded into the standard, because the corporation wants it to be used by its suppliers and 
contract manufacturers without restrictions, or because the use of the substance in mate-
rials, parts and products is regarded as improbable – or is just ignored.  
It also had to be considered in the evaluation that both the public and private regula-
tion of substance risks is a dynamic process. In temporal terms, global compliance is not 
a fixed category, but constantly changes in line with the publication of new laws and 
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regulations and the issuing and amendments of new corporate standards. As the re-
quirements of the RoHS Directive for hazardous substances in electrical and electronic 
equipment only became applicable on July 1st, 2006, no corporation was formally 
obliged to adhere to these requirements at the time of the evaluation of the standards. 
Nevertheless, whether or not the standards were already adapted to the obligations of 
the directive was taken into account in the empirical analysis. 
There is no common standard as to which substances should be included in the cor-
porate substance lists. The substances covered by the individual standards therefore vary 
to a great extent. Some substances irrelevant for the sector may be included, or other 
relevant substances left out. Substance bans are thus only useful as indicators for legal 
compliance, if the use of the substances is relevant for the sector and has not been aban-
doned for other reasons. 
Even if an evaluation is restricted to the relevant substances, considerable differences 
can be found. These variations do not necessarily imply that the corporation positively 
decided not to regulate a certain substance. In some cases they may be explained by the 
differences in the range of substances, considered relevant for the individual corporate 
profile with respect to manufactured products and contracted suppliers.  
1. Geographical Generalisation of Regulatory Standards 
Compliance with environmental law presupposes knowledge about the regulatory basis. 
Environmental management systems such as ISO 14001 ff. and other environmental 
management schemes therefore require the documentation and regular updates of all 
relevant regulation. In nearly half the standards such regulatory information is given, 
either in the form of reference lists, or in a special column of the restricted substance 
list, often referring to legal norms as reasons for the inclusion of a substance. Such ref-
erences also enable the suppliers to independently keep track of regulatory develop-
ments. A review of all the standards shows considerable differences in terms of detail 
and precision. Often, no accurate first-hand knowledge seems to be available for the 
main jurisdictions of the global market – sometimes not even for the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the respective corporation. 
The reasons given in standards for substance bans can therefore also be misleading. 
In many cases, companies declare bans or other measures to control substance risk as 
their own demands, even if they are legally required to do so. Typical examples are the 
labelling requirement for nonylphenol, which is given in Directive 67/548/EEC, and the 
‘labelling requirement’ for polychlorinated naphthalenes, which, according to the Japa-
nese Chemical Substance Control Law, even requires authorisation. Restrictions for 
formaldehyde and dioxin, given in the German Ordinance on the Prohibition of Chemi-
cals, as well as in Swedish and Austrian regulations, are also purported to be genuine 
corporate self-regulatory standards in many corporate lists. Similarly, some standards 
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base restrictions on self-regulatory standards or customer requirements. The ban on 
short-chain chlorinated paraffins, for example, is based on the German Blue Angel label 
and a Swedish eco-label for office equipment emissions, because ‘no laws and regula-
tions regulate this category of hazardous substances’ (Maxim IC), whereas the existing 
Dutch regulation is ignored.  
On the other hand, in some corporate standards for certain substances, regulations are 
cited that do not exist, are outdated or do not apply to the substance in question or its 
application. The standard of a U.S. manufacturer of mobile phones bans PBDE, which 
is based on ‘Canadian Regulation’ (Motorola, 2005). However, no Canadian regulation 
for PBDE as yet exists, although voluntary strategies are currently under development 
in cooperation with the industry.20 A Californian manufacturer of computer processors 
and chipsets bans all uses of mercury except for lamps and relays, switches, contacts 
and guards based on Directive 89/677/EEC, although this specific directive only re-
stricts uses of mercury in substances or processes not relevant to the electronics sector, 
like antifouling paints, wood preservation, textile impregnation or water treatment (In-
tel, 2003). 
In one case a Japanese electronics corporation refers to a – nonexistent – EU Direc-
tive to explain the ban of polychlorinated naphthalenes, without mentioning the Japa-
nese authorization requirement or the Swiss prohibition. 
Possible reasons for this lack of knowledge are the fragmentation of the regulatory 
framework for transnational production and marketing networks, poor transparency of 
regulatory requirements – even though the recent development of online-resources fa-
cilitates research on national legislation – and an insufficient doctrinal treatment of the 
global legal regime for chemical products by environmental lawyers. In the light of 
these shortcomings, the resulting material contents of the corporate standards are, at 
least at first sight, relatively homogenous and comprehensive.  
a) Global Compliance with Product Quality Standards 
Most requirements for corporate standards concern problematic substances in the fin-
ished product. Typical product standards that can virtually be found in the list of every 
corporation are restrictions or bans on asbestos, PCB, ozone-depleting substances, some 
heavy metals, and certain brominated flame retardants.21  
                                                 
20  See the official website of the Canadian Ministry of Environment, http://www.ec.gc.ca/CEPARegistry/ 
documents/subs_list/PBDE_draft/PBDEfaq.cfm, last visited 21 February 2007. 
21  Other potential candidates for corporate bans and restrictions include polychlorinated terphenyls, pesticides like 
DDT or mirex, azo dyes, phthalates, polychlorinated naphthalenes, short-chain chlorinated paraffins, organotin 
compounds, ethylene glycol ethers, perfluoroorganic compounds and radioactive substances. 
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A corporate standard is considered to be globally compliant if it adopts all relevant 
product-related public regulations on a substance used in the production chain. By the 
same token, not globally compliant are corporate substance lists that adopt a standard 
only for products destined for the territory to which this regulation formally applies. As 
demonstrated by the chart, global compliance with public product regulation can only 
partly be found in corporate standards.  
This raises doubts with regard to a linear perception of the trading-up process: the 
horizontal transfer of norms should be seen as a selective and interactive process rather 
than as inevitable determination. Even in the domestic context, sociologists of law have 
stressed the difference between law in the books and law in action, and questioned the 
effectiveness of legal regulation, as they usually found low compliance rates in empiri-
cal studies. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the global compliance rates are 
even slightly lower than domestic compliance. While the full global compliance of cor-
porate standards seems to be an ideal rather than a reality, a more qualitative evaluation 
of the standards shows that national public regulation still exercises a significant influ-
ence on global corporate standards. 
Chart 4: Corporate Standards Compliant with Selected Jurisdictions 
Highest Regulatory Standard Global Compliance of Corporate Standards* 
Jurisdiction substance (group) regul. type and date** Domestic foreign 
  all EU standards (9) non EU standards (31) 
PBDE BAN   01/03 6 28 




NL SCCPs*** RES   11/99 3 14 
  all Japanese (18) non Jap. (22) 
Japan polychlorinated  
naphthalenes 
DIS     1988 16 7 
 all U.S. (11) non U.S. (29) 
USA offshore production  using CFCs DIS    11/90 6 8 
Annotations:  
*) Figures relate to those of the 40 analysed standards that were positively considered to be globally compliant in 
relation to the current regulation of a specific substance – other standards do not necessarily violate the law! For 
example, some of the standards found in the internet could not be considered globally compliant, as they were 
issued before the publication of the RoHS Directive and did therefore not include its obligations; other standards do 
not list the substance in question for whatever reason, or have only informational status. 
**) ‘BAN’ signifies prohibition of substance for electrical and electronic equipment; ‘RES’ – threshold limit level 
for product applications requirement; ‘DIS’ – authorization, notification or labelling duties. The dates give the 
month/year of formal publication of the regulation.  
***) Short chain chlorinated paraffins. 
Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (PBDE) 
With respect to the ban on PBDE, only six of the 40 corporate standards were not glob-
ally compliant. Foreign standards of corporations outside the EU were no less compliant 
than EU standards. Apart from three European standards that are never globally compli-
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ant because they are not normatively binding, only one Japanese standard, one British 
and one Canadian standard were not considered to be ‘globally compliant’ with the 
RoHS prohibitions, as they only required substitution without giving a definite deadline. 
As these standards were researched about a year before the scheduled application of the 
ban, this can be considered as a good global compliance rate. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that regarding a PBDE ban, not so much seems to be at stake for the electrical and 
electronic equipment industry. Most of its applications have already been phased out 
and for the remaining applications alternatives exist, albeit not necessarily less problem-
atic ones than PBDE. Often other brominated flame-retardants, which are also sub-
stances of concern, are used e.g. in printed circuit boards (Lohse and Lißner et al, 2003: 
100 f). Moreover, certain voluntary industrial initiatives on PBDE have existed in 
Europe since the 1980s (Leisewitz and Schwarz, 2001: 37 f). In the USA, the only do-
mestic manufacturer of two chemicals of the PBDE group declared a production stop till 
the end of 2004, after the U.S. EPA had recommended that they be phased out.22 In the 
meantime several U.S. states as well as the federal U.S. EPA initiated regulation proc-
esses concerning PBDE.  
Apart from lead, the other substances prohibited by the RoHS Directive – mercury, 
cadmium, hexavalent chromium and PBB – show similar results. At least regarding 
their application in mobile phones, they are either not functionally required or easily 
substituted.23 
Lead 
Compared to the other above-mentioned substances dealt with in the directive, much 
fewer corporations adopted the requirements of the RoHS Directive on the use of lead in 
electronic and electrical equipment in their standards governing their worldwide trans-
actions with business partners. Still two thirds of the European and more than half the 
non-EU corporate standards have already integrated the ban on lead. Many of the for-
eign standards are directly influenced by the EU Directive. This can be concluded in at 
least five Japanese standards, which more or less literally repeat the exemptions listed in 
the Directive’s Annex. 
It seems even more rewarding to look closely at the cases in which no global compli-
ance could be assumed. The lead prohibition for solder in the EU RoHS Directive is 
sometimes ignored by competent and well-informed corporate leaders, such as Intel or 
Samsung. Instead of adopting the prohibition, these leaders first require disclosure for 
                                                 
22  See http://www.epa.gov/oppt/pbde/pubs/qanda.htm, last visited 21 February 2007. 
23  Guidance Document – Environmentally Sound Management of Used and End-Of-Life Mobile Phones, Basel 
Convention ‘Mobile Phone Partnership Initiative”, Draft, March 2006, http://www.basel.int/industry/mppiwp/ 
guid-comment/guidoc200406.pdf, last visited 21 February 2007. 
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the inclusion of lead in electronic parts and materials, probably to get an overview of the 
actual uses and substitution possibilities. This may also be regarded as a more realistic 
approach to the preparation of full compliance, as a text passage in the IBM standard 
shows. According to IBM, the maximum concentration level requirements of the RoHS 
directive have still not been established. Therefore IBM requires of its suppliers only 
disclosure of lead contained in all materials, parts and products supplied for IBM appli-
cations. However, IBM already reserves the right to introduce ‘(o)ther more stringent 
IBM specifications’ that may supersede the disclosure requirement (IBM, 2003). 
Other companies are even more explicit with their problems concerning the strict re-
quirement of lead substitution in most electronic and electrical equipment applications: 
‘Maxim will continue to supply leaded parts to customers that prefer leaded parts, there-
fore lead will not be totally eliminated from solder and surface finish operations. Cus-
tomers demanding lead containing parts are typically those that are not impacted by 
European legislation. (...) In addition, the technology to eliminate lead from certain pro-
ducts has not been developed and proven acceptable for commercial applications. Flip 
chip and BGA products currently have no lead free alternatives’ (Maxim Integrated 
Products and Dallas Semiconductors). At the same time, this citation implies that some 
customers of the electronics industry still seem to supply regionally restricted markets. 
Short-Chain Chlorinated Paraffins (SCCP) 
Short-chain chlorinated paraffins are only listed in 29 of the 40 standards. Even in the 
case of Royal Philipps Electronics, the only corporation in the sample with its head of-
fice in the Netherlands, short chain chlorinated paraffins are only banned in the specifi-
cations of certain product divisions. It is striking to see that standards of EU corpora-
tions show even less compliance (3 out of 9) than standards of non-EU corporations (14 
out of 31). This could be due to the fact that compliance of the Dutch restrictions with 
EU law is disputed in Europe and that corporate standards are directly influenced by or 
even explicitly refer to Decision 95/1 of the Paris Commission (PARCOM), though this 
is an act of public international law of which the formal addressees are states only. 
Polychlorinated Naphthalenes 
Regarding polychlorinated naphthalenes there is a high compliance rate in Japan; of 18 
standards, 16 prohibit the substance group, while the remaining two require disclosure, 
so that authorization requirements can be fulfilled. In contrast, less than half of the non-
Japanese corporate standards are globally compliant as they explicitly ban the substance 
or require disclosure. However, the substance group, which historically had been in use 
in the electronics industry for transformer and capacitor fluids (even before PCBs were 
introduced) and in electroplating, was phased out in the USA in the late 1970s and most 
of Europe in the 1980s (van de Plassche and Schwegler; Santillo and Johnston, 2004). 
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In Europe it is today classified as a low production volume substance with only one 
French supplier.24 Additionally, even if the information on national regulatory require-
ments worldwide has improved enormously since the emergence of the internet, Japa-
nese laws are still difficult to track and exist only in provisional translations into Eng-
lish.25 It may therefore well be that the substance (and its Japanese regulation) was not 
considered relevant enough to be included in non-Japanese corporate standards. 
b) Extraterritorial Use of Production Standards 
Standards aimed at the regulation of production risks could also be disseminated hori-
zontally to other jurisdictions, if they were included in corporate product standards. This 
could mitigate the frequently stark disparity between the ambitious harmonisation of 
product standards and the ‘race to the bottom’ effects of production standards. 
However, the evaluated standards showed rather diverse results regarding such pro-
duction requirements. Some corporate standards explicitly exclude substances used in 
the manufacturing processes of suppliers from corporate substance control.26 Other 
standards avoid the issue of auxiliary substances in manufacturing processes of business 
partners or leave the question open.  
Still, corporations are often not only concerned with the contents of their products, 
but also with the regulation of production processes, especially with respect to auxiliary 
substances. Some corporate standards thus extend all substance bans and restrictions to 
all substances used in manufacturing processes of suppliers and contract manufacturers. 
Still, such extreme positions taken by corporations – accepting either no responsibil-
ity at all or full responsibility for all substances used by business partners – seem to be 
the exception. The general rule is rather an intermediate level of responsibility for sub-
stances used in production processes of other economic agents in the supply chain. Ten 
corporate standards therefore include restrictions for certain auxiliary substances, espe-
cially ozone-depleting substances and ethylene glycol ethers.  
Intel even distinguishes between suppliers and contract manufacturers (‘OEMs’) and 
has higher standards for auxiliary chemicals in the production processes of contract 
manufacturers. This shows even more differentiated levels of responsibility: the basic 
responsibility for suppliers only manufacturing parts and materials, the increased re-
                                                 
24  See the ESIS-database, http://ecb.jrc.it/esis/, last visited 21 February 2007. 
25  See the Japanese Law Concerning the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of Their Manufacture, 
etc., http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/downloadfiles/cChemicalControl.pdf and its enforcing ordinance, 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/downloadfiles/kashin1.pdf, last visited 21 February 2007. 
26  E.g., ‘Chemical substances used for the production of the Purchased Goods are not subject to chemical substance 
control, on condition that the chemical substances are used only for processing at the suppliers or the contractors 
of the suppliers and the chemical substances do not remain in the Purchased Goods.’ (Nippon Chemi-Con, 2003). 
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sponsibility for business partners manufacturing products which bear the lead firm’s 
label, and the full responsibility for substances included in their own products or for 
auxiliary substances used by the lead firm itself. 
CFCs and Other Ozone-depleting Substances 
The most important group of auxiliary substances regulated in corporate standards, are 
ozone-depleting substances, commonly used as solvents in the production of semicon-
ductors. In some standards, these are the only substances prohibited in manufacturing 
processes of ‘upstream’ business partners. An evaluation of such a ban on CFCs and 
other ozone-depleting substances should take into account that the phase-out of CFCs as 
halogenated solvents has been on the political and industrial agenda at least since the 
1980s. For some ozone-depleting substances the Montreal Protocol required the phase-
out already in the late 1990s. Sec 604 (b) of the U.S. Clean Air Act required a complete 
phase-out of CFCs out of production for the domestic market by 2000. The European 
Union and Japan both implemented the Montreal Protocol in the 1990s. The production 
and use of ozone-depleting substances was thus already densely regulated before the 
analysed standards were issued. 
Still, it does make sense for corporations to regulate the use of ozone-depleting sub-
stances as auxiliary substances in manufacturing processes of suppliers and contract 
manufactures: as admitted in Art. 5 of the Montreal Protocol, CFCs can still be pro-
duced for export to developing countries for their basic domestic purposes.27 The obliga-
tions of the Protocol or national regulation may thus be circumvented by the offshore 
outsourcing of manufacturing processes to developing countries or even countries not 
signatories to the Protocol. Corporations banning these substances from manufacturing 
processes of their products and components therefore commit themselves to resisting 
such circumvention. Further, other ozone-depleting substances like HCFCs are still in 
common use as CFC substitutes and a complete phase-out according to the Montreal 
Protocol is not required until 2030. Yet several American, European and Japanese stan-
dards already now ban the use of HCFCs as auxiliary substances. 
This ban may concern all or some of the substances listed in the annexes of the 
Montreal Protocol. Corporate standards sometimes use the distinction between two clas-
ses of ozone-depleting substances (basically CFCs and HCFCs), which does not follow 
the classification in the annexes of the Montreal protocol, but corresponds to sec 601 ff. 
U.S. Clean Air Act.28 Sec. 611 (d) Clean Air Act requires under certain conditions the 
                                                 
27  See also sec 604 (e) U.S. Clean Air Act. 
28  According to the U.S. Clean Air Act, Class I substances include CFCs and halons, as well as carbon tetrachloride 
and methyl chloroform listed in annex A and B of the Montreal Protocol; Class II covers the HCFCs in annex C, 
group I of the Protocol. 
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labelling of products manufactured with CFCs and some other substances. The use of 
HCFCs can also lead to labelling requirements, if a petition based on adequate data is 
accepted by the public administration. As already mentioned, the Intel standard distin-
guishes between manufacturing processes of suppliers and those of contract manufac-
turers: while for contract manufacturers the use of all ozone-depleting substances in 
manufacturing processes is prohibited, suppliers just have to avoid the use of CFCs and 
some other especially problematic substances.  
In the IBM standard a clear reason is given for the inclusion of standards for manu-
facturing processes of the suppliers: ‘the use of certain materials in manufacturing mate-
rials, parts, and products for IBM applications may restrict IBM’s ability to market 
products in certain countries or jurisdictions’ (IBM, 2003). In particular, the prohibition 
of such substances in manufacturing processes helps to avoid potential labelling duties 
according to section 611 of the U.S. Clean Air Act. However, only one of the corporate 
standards requires disclosure for ozone-depleting substances. It seems that the require-
ment to label products manufactured by means of ozone-depleting substances is so 
daunting to many manufacturers that they prefer to prohibit such substances altogether. 
Still, only 14 out of the 40 standards explicitly ban CFCs from manufacturing proc-
esses of suppliers or contract manufacturers. This relatively low rate of explicit compli-
ance could be explained by the fact that the obligations of the Clean Air Act are rather 
restrictively applied (only to manufacturing processes of the manufacturer, not to those 
of suppliers). Therefore, most of the standards concerning the use of ozone-depleting 
substances in manufacturing processes may be shaped by self-regulation rather than 
compliance. 
2. Anticipatory Effect of Regulatory Standards 
The horizontal transfer of standards can partly be understood as a factual result of com-
pliance with formal product legislation of various markets. An example for more 
autonomous forms of private self-regulation are standards anticipating either already 
existing legislation not yet in force (early compliance), or public debates and political 
initiatives on substances of concern which have not even led to regulatory outcome (vo-
luntary standards). 
a) Early Compliance 
In some cases corporations demand that their suppliers substitute certain substances 
earlier than legally required. While for the RoHS Directive of the EU the original com-
pliance deadline is July 1st, 2006, almost half the Japanese and U.S.-American and one 
European Corporation set earlier target dates for substitution. These periods of early 
compliance range from a few months to more than three years. Only six (mostly Ger-
man) corporations explicitly stick to the legal date. The fact that many German corpora-
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tions take a formalistic attitude reflects their conception of the standards merely being 
of an informative nature. Other corporations do not give any specific compliance dead-
lines, or they state that they already comply. Their justification for fulfilling require-
ments in advance is that only this will ‘ensure a successful transition’ to compliance 
with the RoHS Directive (HP, 2005). This reason is of special relevance if both manu-
facturers and suppliers are located outside the European Union, as the implementation 
process then has to be organized without the administrative infrastructure provided by 
public authorities and industrial associations in the EU. Effective compliance is then 
only possible if production networks do not stick to a passive attitude of formalistic 
compliance. Often, complex transition processes provoked by public regulation are dif-
ficult to control and predict. Therefore, safety margins have to be introduced in order to 
monitor and control the implementation process and thus guarantee effective compli-
ance. Within the transition period an active implementation process must be organised 
by the lead firms of the production networks. 
b) Voluntary Standards for Substances of Concern 
Some corporate standard requirements are not based on existing public regulation at all. 
For example, the use of certain glycol ethers is forbidden in several cases in production 
processes or in products. In many other cases they are categorised as restricted, report-
able or controlled substances.  
Only under the German workplace standard TRGS 609 is the substitution of methyl-
ene and ethylene glycol ethers and their acetates required as far as possible. They may 
not be used by young and pregnant workers, and special measures must be taken to re-
duce workplace exposure. They are also classified as dangerous according to Directive 
67/548/EEC, with the result that disclosure is legally required within the EU.  
The corporate standards go beyond these restrictions, however. The far-reaching 
commitment to prohibit their use not only within the corporation itself, but also to ban 
them in production processes of business partners may result from the high scandalising 
potential of these substances: they are highly teratogenic and therefore pose a serious 
threat especially to pregnant workers and their unborn babies. According to a reference 
in one standard, the semiconductor industry has voluntarily committed itself to the phas-
ing-out of ethylen glycol ethers in manufacturing processes. Considering the extensive 
processes of offshore outsourcing to South-East Asia in semiconductor production, it is 
not surprising that the public authorities of OECD countries avoid direct regulation and 
prefer alternatives without territorial restrictions such as voluntary commitments by 
industrial associations or individual companies.  
Another example concerns perfluoralkyl sulfonates, which are sometimes prohibited 
in corporate standards. This is a case of self-regulation in anticipation of a significant 
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new use rule currently being drawn up by the U.S. EPA under the Toxic Substances 
Control Act.29  
In various other corporate standards, substances such as PVC, phthalates, formalde-
hyde, etc. are banned, but only in singular cases, so that no clear patterns emerge. 
Most corporate requirements that exceed legal obligations do not concern bans, but 
are rather soft instruments such as disclosure requirements or recommendations to seek 
substitutes. 
In the context of the Basel Convention, there is a voluntary initiative on waste mobile 
phones, including the phasing-out of certain problematic substances from mobile 
phones. One possible explanation for the commitment of the manufacturers may be the 
fact that it is still under discussion whether or not waste mobile phones should be con-
sidered as toxic waste according to the Convention. 30 Even if there is no clear decision 
on whether electronics waste is covered by the Basel Convention, the electronics indus-
try may still feel under pressure by the mere possibility of being subjected to restrictions 
in that respect. After all, the producers of mobile phones did participate in a voluntary 
programme under the Basel Convention, committing themselves to ambitious and de-
tailed obligations.31 
c) Procedural Requirements Beyond Legal Compliance 
The substantial demand to ban certain substances, e.g. those listed in the Montreal Pro-
tocol, in the manufacturing process even if they are no longer traceable in the final 
products, is often combined with procedural requirements for environmental manage-
ment systems.  
More than half the standards, especially those of Japanese and U.S. corporations, re-
quire the certification of an environmental management system for all their suppliers. In 
many cases these certifications either could be made according to adopted systems such 
as ISO 14001 ff., or according to individual specifications or minimum requirements 
given in questionnaires attached to the corporate standards. 
3. Inter-organisational Aspects of Corporate Standards 
Compliance with product-related standards directly relevant to the physical qualities of 
the product itself requires cooperation throughout the supply chain from the raw materi-
                                                 
29  See http://www.epa.gov/EPA-TOX/2006/April/Day-10/t3400.htm, last visited 21 February 2007. 
30  For the position in favour of categorizing waste electronic and electrical equipment containing heavy metals as 
toxic waste according to the Basel convention, see the Basel Action Network (BAN), http://www.ban.org/, last 
visited 21 February 2007. 
31  See the ‘Mobile Phone Partnership Initiative’ under the Basel Convention, http://www.basel.int/industry/ 
mppi.html, last visited 21 February 2007. 
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als to the finished consumer product. Manufacturers and their suppliers thus try to inte-
grate environmental and health standards into supply chain management. Production 
network structures and inter-organisational standards can thereby help to spread stan-
dards globally and across different industry sectors. 
Reference to other corporate standards, which can often be found in corporate sub-
stance lists, shows how suppliers ‘cascade the requirements’ (Motorola, 2005) to sub-
tier suppliers without direct contractual relationship with the producer of the final con-
sumer product, so that the entire supply chain is confronted with the standard of lead 
firms. Some standards also directly address the responsibility of the suppliers. This 
means that suppliers are not only obliged to comply with the material standards, e.g. 
they have to substitute lead in certain applications, but they also have to assure that their 
own suppliers stick to the standards of the customer. This can be even more demanding 
if not only product standards but also production standards come into play, as in the 
case of IBM.  
The full impact of this cascading process can only be understood if business relations 
are not visualized as linear value chains, but rather as complex production networks: 
customers multiply the circulation of a standard if they have multiple input from many 
suppliers. And a supplier with many customers will also factually proliferate his cus-
tomers’ standards by selling compliant products to all other customers because of 
economies of scale. In the electronics and the automotive sector recent structural 
changes have led to the emergence of influential ‘first tier suppliers’. Often, these sup-
pliers supply system components to more than one final assembler and therefore have 
comparable economic power. They often develop product design as well as production 
standards in close cooperation with their customers (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990: 
146 f.).  
Nevertheless, in most cases it is the final product manufacturer who initiates the de-
velopment of standards, as also documented by the fact that the standards found were 
mostly those of leading final product manufacturers. But even if standards are set uni-
laterally by the manufacturer, suppliers do not necessarily accept them. One interview 
partner from a corporation supplying system components for the automotive industry 
reported that on one occasion they rejected a customer’s threshold level for a certain 
substance and sought to re-negotiate the contract. According to the supplier, who in this 
case had not been consulted beforehand, the value was later changed by the customer, a 
well-known U.S. automobile manufacturer.32 
                                                 
32  Interview with a supplier of electronic system components for the automotive industry, Frankfurt am Main, Feb-
ruary 25th, 2005. 
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The corporate standards analysed here are used by different actors in the value chain. 
They are not necessarily restricted to distinct industry sectors. For example, companies 
in the electronics industry also refer to standards laid down in the automotive sector, 
and manufacturers of polymers must adhere to the standards of various business sectors. 
Thus, corporate standards are not restricted to one business sector, but may spread 
across the whole global market. 
E. Summary 
The results of this empirical study show that most corporate leaders of transnational 
business networks are not passive subjects of the law, but that they actively select legal 
norms, that they take the law into their own hands, or adapt standards according to their 
particular needs. At the same time, corporate actors often use national legislation as a 
point of reference providing them with normative orientation. The results therefore con-
firm the assumption that private product standards in the transnational field are neither 
characterised by the formal application of national regulations, nor by forms of autono-
mous self-regulation that are completely out of touch with state-based law.  
The term ‘proactive compliance’ may be too optimistic a term to describe the quanti-
tative rates of explicit compliance. Regarding the selective application of laws and the 
wide self-regulatory scope, corporate standards seem to have an appropriative rather 
than a proactive character. However, a more thoroughgoing qualitative analysis showed 
that in cases of lower (or less anticipatory) compliance the concerned substances were 
either no longer used in the sector, or for some applications no technical substitute had 
been developed until the standards were issued. Therefore leading firms first aimed at 
getting an overview over the actual uses and thus required disclosure – possibly as a 
first step in the implementation process. In the case of ozone-depleting substances the 
labelling requirements of the U.S. Clean Air Act have been applied very restrictively by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. It is therefore no wonder that the impact on 
non-U.S. corporations has been relatively low. 
The empirical study confirms our thesis of anticipatory effect more clearly than that 
of global compliance, which might result from the fact that the analysis (regarding the 
early implementation of the RoHS Directive) is methodically less difficult. The phe-
nomenon of anticipatory compliance also shows how the distinction between compli-
ance and self-regulation gets blurred: on the one hand it seems impossible to change the 
contents of a complex product from one day to the next; on the other hand it can hardly 
be determined exactly how long in advance the conversion process should start. Some 
standards even banned the use of substances immediately after the EU-Directive was 
published. This also shows that multinational corporations often do not stick to legal 
norms in a formalistic manner, but rather take requirements as a rough orientation for 
their own autonomous standards. 
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The cases of ‘true’ self-regulation, i.e. private standards for substances of concern 
not yet regulated, also have an anticipatory character, as they often appear in the context 
of regulatory initiatives, be it on the national or international level. Corporate self-
regulatory standards often explicitly state this reason to justify self-regulation, e.g. 
‘These lists ... have been compiled to meet existing and anticipated legal requirements 
and market demands’ (Ericsson, 2003). 
However, reflecting the phenomenon of combined compliance and self-regulation, 
the motives given for developing the standards, namely ‘observing the law’ and ‘pro-
tecting the environment’, are more or less interchangeable; there was no evidence that 
different argumentations relating to compliance or self-regulation respectively correlate 
with more or less stringent standards. 
IV. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis focuses on the influence of national or European public regulation 
on corporate standards. Scholars of political science or legal theory often explain private 
standards in the transnational sphere with other factors than (expected) regulatory re-
quirements. They usually refer to public pressure generated by civil society agents or by 
socially and environmentally conscious consumers, fear of litigation, and sometimes 
even to factors within the corporate sphere such as the professional ethos of employees 
(e.g. Haufler, 2001). It would not make much sense to argue that regulation has priority 
over these factors. Still, it is interesting to consider the role public regulation can play 
regarding the other factors.  
Litigation has played no important role so far in the management of chemical risks in 
the electronics sector; the same applies for environmentally conscious consumer 
schemes, such as eco-labels.33 In terms of public pressure, changed social perceptions of 
the responsibilities of transnational corporations and business networks can play an im-
portant role in the development of inter-organisational standards dealing with social and 
ecological issues. This has been illustrated by the case of the apparel and sports’ equip-
ment industry, where large global players like Nike started to develop social and envi-
ronmental codes after massive protests about working conditions in Asian sweatshops. 
Even if manufacturing has been outsourced, and is therefore in the hands of legally in-
dependent suppliers or contract manufacturers, responsibility for the working conditions 
might still be attributed to transnational corporations. By developing inter-
organisational ethical standards they often acknowledge this responsibility. This was 
also seen as the only means to protect the image of the brand from attacks by NGOs. 
                                                 
33  Although the TCO-Label exists for electronic office equipment and has some testing and emission requirements 
for chemical substances, especially brominated flame retardants, it is rarely referenced in corporate standards, see 
http://www.tcodevelopment.com/, last visited 21 February 2007. 
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Similarly, questions of ecological and social responsibility for offshore production have 
been raised in the electronics sector. This was shown when substandard practices of 
recycling and waste disposal were documented in China (Puckett and Smith, 2002). 
The risks of product liability, NGO pressure and image deficits may thus be an im-
portant mainspring for corporate risk management in the electronics sector. However, as 
a rule, neither a judge nor the average consumer is competent or capable enough to de-
cide hard cases and assess the complex mechanisms of toxic risk management. Even if 
judges or consumer organisations can always consult scientific expertise, it rarely helps 
to achieve definite certainty. But whenever in one of the major jurisdictions a ban on a 
certain substance or one of its applications is imposed, this signals the transformation of 
arbitrary suspicions within the realm of scientific debate into the solid facts of regula-
tory policy. In the transnational sphere the probability of classic law enforcement 
mechanisms may be drastically reduced; yet that does not make public regulation ‘mere-
ly symbolic’, and hence ineffective. On the contrary, it is precisely the ‘symbolic’ qual-
ity of national regulation that seems to make it so effective in influencing the behaviour 
of globally operating corporations (Führ, 2003; Berman 2006: 945 f., 951 f.). These 
symbolic qualities may appeal less to public inspectors, whose scope for controlling 
multinational corporations is restricted anyway, but they are likely to be more appealing 
to consumers and environmental organisations, the media, or perhaps even juries in 
U.S.-American product liability processes. Similarly, on the side of the addressees of 
legal duties, these symbolic qualities may be of less interest to small and medium-sized 
businesses, which have no public image to lose, but more to global players with well-
known brands. Nevertheless, for the credibility of performance within a specific busi-
ness sector, it seems increasingly important for smaller firms to fulfil certain social and 
environmental standards (Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung, 2000). 
The orientation of transnational private standards towards public regulation and the 
anticipation of public policies are characteristic for a changed relationship between the 
state and the private sector, especially multinational corporations. In contrast to the clas-
sic hierarchical relationship, the phenomenon of proactive compliance implies that in-
terdependencies between public regulation and corporate standardisation arise from the 
mutual reliance between globally operating corporations and national legislators. In the 
field of product risk management both sides are constrained by the demand to adapt 
products or product regulation to various possible contexts: large corporations tend to 
design uniform products for the global market, principally complying with all regula-
tory environments. Similarly, national public authorities have to anticipate the variety of 
functional contexts of the products to make comprehensive risk assessments and draw 
regulatory consequences. Agents of the private and public sector alike are overburdened 
by unforeseen regulatory and technological developments in the other respective area. 
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To reduce this mutual unpredictability, public and private standards have to be devel-
oped in coordination. This presupposes a mutual reflection on the other sector’s ration-
ality, i.e. each sector has an interest in its objectives being reflected in the other sector’s 
planning. Accordingly, the phenomenon of proactive compliance can be described as 
the reflection of national regulation and public interests in corporate global standards, 
combining elements of regulatory compliance and industrial self-regulation. 
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